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Since the early years of environmental activism, transnationally organized social movements have 
been crucial to advancing climate action within international politics. Transnational social movement 
organizations (TSMOs) have developed robust, diverse strategies for achieving change, including but 
not limited to engagement with international governance organizations (IGOs). Historically, IGOs 
have tended to support market based, incremental carbon reductions, as opposed to more radical 
climate solutions that address the connection between global capitalism and the climate crisis. My 
research seeks to understand if TSMOs critical of the current political order are able to advance 
radical climate action within these historically reformist institutions. Drawing from updated data on 
the engagement of environmental social movements, I find that geographic location and the age of 
TSMOs continue to influence how much they engage with IGOs. However, I suggest that ideological 
alignment cannot fully explain the differences between pragmatic engagement and rejectionism. 
Rather among TSMOs critical of international environmental politics, the decision to engage with a 
given IGO is likely based upon the opportunities offered in the relationship and the usefulness of 
such opportunities. From this, I then analyze the specific opportunities that IGOs, reported by 
environmental TSMOs, provide and categorize these opportunities as influence or access. I argue that 
access opportunities, such as networking, that allow TSMOs to develop their movements, empower 
TSMOs to be in a better position to demand influence within international governance. I then suggest 
that spaces in which TSMOs are involved in designing how they participate have more potential to 
advance radical solutions. TSMOs are then able to operate as decision makers instead of actors trying 
to influence decision makers. Importantly, the affiliation and primary aim of IGOs influences what 
type of opportunities they provide such that we see developing collaboration among large UN 
affiliated IGOs, that could be suggestive of how international governance may come to support 
radical climate action. 
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1.0 Introduction 
To understand the future of climate action it is important to first understand why and how 
the current environmental movement has come to be. International climate politics consists of a 
wide range of actors not limited to an enormous, diverse network of activists working globally to 
mobilize solutions, international political agreements and agencies struggling to ensure 
meaningful commitments and many national governments and transnational corporations stalling 
action due to personal interests. Our ability to mitigate the worst effects of global warming will 
largely depend upon how these actors come together and compete for influence in international 
politics.  
The globalization of national policies has forced activists to seek influence in actors beyond 
local and national governments, namely international actors like the UN, regional trade agreements 
and the WTO (Smith et al. 2017). This has brought about the development of a robust network of 
transnationally organized social movements (TSMOs), with the number of TSMOs growing from 
just about 100 organizations in 1953 to more than 2000 as of 2013 (Smith et al., 2017). These 
networks of organizations are “bound together by shared values, a common discourse and dense 
exchanges of information and services” such that they are increasingly important actors on the 
international political stage (Keck & Sikkink, 2019, p. 2).  
 Not only has the number of TSMOs increased but the advancement of their networks has  
“helped fuel the growing participation of locally-based activist groups in global politics” and has 
“helped radicalize activist networks in these arenas” (Smith et al. 2017, p. 3). Transnational 
networks work both with IGOs and a wide number of other activists, ranging from short-term 
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cooperation to cohosting of events and even intensive movement building around common issues 
(Smith et al., 2017).  
International governance has had a range of responses to the influx of social movements in 
global politics. A lack of democratic processes and continued emphasis on nation states in decision 
making has drawn the mechanisms of international governance under increased scrutiny by 
activists (Tallberg and Jonnson 2010). Globalized economic and political processes and the 
continued failure of national governments to address the deepening climate crisis and economic 
inequality suggest a much-needed shift away from the nation state as the most important form of 
international actor. This has created a normative call for IGOs to be more inclusive of a diverse 
set of actors in their operations, such that number of opportunities and resources available to 
TSMOs has greatly increased over the past two decades (Tallberg and Jonnson 2010).  
However, this inclusion has not been uniform and is heavily influenced by the focus of 
international governance organizations (IGOs) and its membership, specifically powerful nation 
state members (Bond 2012). Member states work to limit the influence of TSMOs that challenge 
their particular national interest (Bond 2012). Additionally, though the number of opportunities 
provided by IGOs has increased over time, these opportunities may not be accessible or may not 
be meaningful in their inclusion of TSMO expertise, instead serving as a means of cooption (Smith 
et al. 2018). Finally, IGOs have been subject to heavy corporate influence both through direct 
lobbying and the indirect influence of corporations in national politics (Smith et al. 2018). So, even 
within the context of increased meaningful opportunities, TSMOs focused on anti-global capitalist 
work may not find strategic advantage to engaging with actors heavily influence by corporations 
(Smith et al. 2018). 
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From the range of ways IGOs have responded to growth of TSMOs, we see a corresponding 
range of strategies TSMOs have for engaging with international politics. Research by Jackie Smith 
and her colleagues found that TSMOs tended to report particular patterns of ties to IGOs. They 
identified three categories of TSMOs based on these ties: 1) multilateralists- those that are linked 
to a wide array of international agencies, 2) pragmatists- those that are more selective in their ties 
to IGOs, and 3) rejectionists those that don’t report connections to IGOs and that operate outside 
the formal inter-state arena (Smith et al., 2020). This research found younger TSMOs have 
increasingly demonstrated rejectionist and pragmatist behavior (Smith et al., 2020).  
Specifically, environmental groups appeared increasingly pragmatic in their approach to 
relationships with IGOs (Smith et al, 2020). This pragmatic approach allows TSMOs to be 
strategic in allocating time and energy to work with IGOs that gives them practical leverage in 
influencing climate action, namely through partnerships with treaties and treaty monitoring bodies. 
These particular partnerships may provide access to information on compliance such that TSMOs 
can work with IGOs and state leaders to strengthen compliance and influence the specifics of 
treaties (Smith et al. 2020). In this context IGOs can be categorized as operational and deliberative. 
Operational IGOs are considered international conventions and treaty monitoring bodies, which 
enforced specific legal commitments of states and may have mechanisms for monitoring 
compliance (Smith et al. 2020). Deliberative IGOs on the other hand are considered UN agencies 
and programmes based upon generalized mandates, and do not require specific policy 
commitments (Smith et al. 2020). Pragmatic environmental TSMOs more often reported ties to 
operational IGOs, as they provide access to resource and opportunities to advance their work, 
while still allowing TSMOs to distance themselves from the theoretical framing of established 
interstate politics. Specifically, when dividing environmental TSMOs into age cohorts, there did 
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not appear to be a difference in the number of ties they report to operational IGOs However, 
younger TSMOs (those founded after 1989) reported a lower number of ties to deliberative IGOs 
compared to older TSMOs.  
I am interested in understanding how climate activism has continued to adapt their 
strategies in response to the increased political volatility and the persistent failures of national 
governments and international efforts to take action. I particularly focus on developments within 
the population of rejectionist and pragmatic TSMOs because I am interested in how environmental 
groups critical of established politics advance their goals within established politics. While it is 
suspected that multilateralist TSMOs are also strategic in their relationships with IGOs and may 
hold counterhegemonic values, focusing on developments of rejectionist and pragmatist allows us 
to more specifically discuss the strategic developments of TSMOs that work on solutions 
potentially more radical than those put forth by state actors.  
I analyze both rejectionist and pragmatic environmental social movement organizations 
and the IGOs with which the pragmatic organizations report relationships. To most usefully build 
upon past research, I focus on the time frame of 2013-2019. I also analyze the opportunities IGOs 
offer TSMOs and how attributes of IGOs influence their provision of opportunities. Specifically, 
I divide provided opportunities between influence and access opportunities based upon if the 
opportunity provides TSMOs with a chance to influence the operations of the IGO or the chance 
to gain access to resources. I supplement this analysis with examples of relationships that exist 
between TSMOs and IGOs to see how the trends identified in my analysis manifest in real, 
dynamic relationships. These case studies in combination with my data analysis allow me to begin 
answering the questions of, “Can advocacy within IGOs advance radical solutions or must activists 
find other ways to bring about meaningful change?” 
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My research supports the findings of Smith et al (2020), with younger TSMOs and those 
located in the global south more often operating independent of established politics. However, 
overall, I note an increase in TSMO connectivity both to other non-governmental organizations 
and to IGOs. With this, I then looked to the opportunities provided by IGOs to understand how 
they may influence TSMO engagement strategies. Based upon an examination of IGOs to which 
TSMOs report ties, I analyze the opportunities and resources that different type of IGOs provide 
in established relationships. I find that some IGOs offer many basic opportunities and resources in 
high proportions, but more significant opportunities or resources are offered less frequently. The 
affiliation and primary aim of IGOs influences what type of opportunities they provide such that 
we see UN affiliated IGOs providing a relatively high number of both influence and access 
opportunities, suggesting the importance of UN affiliated IGOs in advancing the stance 
international governance as a whole takes towards radical environmental action. 
 From my case studies, I argue that TSMOs are not limited by the provision of influence 
opportunities and may engage with IGOs even in the absence of influence opportunities due to the 
range of ways that they have to enact pressure on IGOs. On the other hand, the provision of access 
opportunities is more important to ensure meeting spaces and informational resources to TSMOs. 
From this, I argue that the trends demonstrated in these relationships suggest that TSMOs are able 
to make use of engagement with IGOs to development their networks, use these networks to 
demonstrate their power and with this gain more opportunities to influence operations of IGOs. 
Specifically, we see that as demonstrated in the FAO’s Committee of World Food Security, when 
TSMOs are involved in the planning the operations around partnerships they can advance 
progressive and even radical solutions. While rejectionist work is important for allowing TSMOs 
to strategize and put forth ideas more radical than what is generated by governance organizations, 
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I argue that in spaces where TSMO expertise is truly prioritized, the mechanisms of global 
governance may be capable of advancing radical climate solutions in a more diverse political arena 
and to a wider array of actors.  
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2.0 Literature Review 
Transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) “challenge dominating political 
ideas and cultural codes as well as existing power structures” (Soyez, 2000, p. 8). As technological 
advancements made it easier for people working locally to connect with one another, independent, 
locally rooted work became global movements. Connectivity increased the organizational capacity 
of these groups, as they were able to share resources, knowledge and experience (Smith et al., 
2017). Additionally, it also created a wider diversity in the types of people involved and the ways 
in which these groups function as there’s been an increase in the number of activists and 
organizations based in the global south (Smith et al. 2017).  
This proliferation of transnational advocacy groups signals widespread discontent with 
global economic and environmental practices. In some ways, the very means by which these 
organizations enact change is a critique of global capitalism, but with an increase in the diversity 
of these organizations there has been an increase in the number of those working explicitly against 
global capitalism. In the past 30 years transnational activists have targeted and engaged with 
international governance more frequently and intensely (Hadden 2015). TSMOs have also been 
able to take advantage of civil society spaces such as the World Social Forum, to create alliances 
and build networks. Importantly, these spaces are independent from established political actors, 
allowing for activists to come together to develop their critiques of global capitalism (Bond 2012). 
This can be understood as a convergence of activists’ critiques of the global economic and political 
system (Smith et al. 2018). So, by the mid 1990s transnational organizations had a growing 
consensus that issues as disparate as housing rights, climate change and racial justice, had a 
common root cause in global capitalism (Smith et al. 2018). At the same time that these groups 
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were strengthening their critiques of global capitalism, they were also compiling their vision for 
an alternative future. 
 Within the environmental movement, this convergence of analysis has had huge effects on 
the types of TSMOs working on ‘environmental’ issues and how TSMOs are going about working 
for such action. First, while practices related to sustainable land and resource use have been central 
to many indigenous communities around the world for generations, in countries of the global north 
it was not until the environmental degradation of the industrial revolution that notions of 
conservation caught on (Armerio & Sedrez 2014). In this context, conservation meant that areas 
of nature needed to be preserved and protected from human development. Prior to 2008 the 
environmental movement had largely consisted of one network that embodied western ideals of 
conservation, Climate Action Network (CAN). CAN is still active, representing a reformist 
perspective on environmental issues through the cooperation of well-established NGO’s (Reitan 
and Gibson 2012). CAN’s advocacy has largely emphasized the UN interstate and focused on 
incremental carbon reductions through carbon trading and offsets (Bond 2010). This has proven 
to be a ‘false solution’, thus leading many activist groups to emerge as critical of CAN (Bond 
2010, p. 287). 
This reached a tipping point following the 2007 global recession, as anti-neoliberal and 
global justice movement organizations ‘spilled over’ into the environmental movement (Hadden 
2015). This influx of diverse organizations with a background in global justice encouraged the 
adaptation of climate justice ideals and language in the global environmental discourse (Hadden 
2015). These ideals are embodied in recently emerged networks within the environmental 
movement, Climate Justice Now and Climate Justice Action (Hadden 2015). Climate Justice Now 
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and Climate Justice Action are both more critical of established climate politics, proposing more 
radical options than supported within the established political arena (Hadden, 2015).  
This change in the composition of the environmental movement and what issues are 
deemed environmental alongside other trends in global politics has also changed the way 
environmental TSMOs organize and how they engage with IGOs. Not only has an influx of global 
justice oriented TSMOs into the environmental movement diversified the types of groups working 
on environmental issues, an expanded understanding of climate work also means a larger group of 
actors is relevant to ‘environmental’ work. Additionally, based on Smith et al.’s dataset that 
extends until 2013, the ‘founding cohort’, the range of years in which the organization was 
founded, was identified as the most important factor in determining TSMO’s relationship strategy 
with IGOs (Smith et al. 2020). The founding cohort was classified as starting before or after 1989, 
citing the importance of the end of the cold war on the global political order (Smith et al., 2020). 
Older, more established organizations were more likely to be multilateralists, while younger 
organizations were disproportionately pragmatists and rejectionists (Smith et al. 2020). This 
categorization controlled for the effect of younger TSMOs lacking access and resources necessary 
to build connections by only including TSMOs which report connections to NGOs. The details of 
this idea are available in the appendix.  
These longitudinal trends, identified by Smith et al. (2020), are also reflected in the 
research conducted by Hadden on the UNFCCC’s 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15). 
Importantly, Hadden’s research provides an understanding of how organizations operate 
depending on their engagement status with IGOs. Hadden categorized organizations as 
conventional or contentious based upon the tactics an organization used towards IGOs. 
Conventional organizations tended to attend conferences and lobby politicians, whereas 
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contentious organizations tended to hold demonstrations and public awareness campaigns (Hadden 
2015). So, Hadden’s research does the very important work of demonstrating how TSMOs work 
with and outside of established politics to achieve their aims, namely through conventional and 
contentious action, respectively. Pragmatist TSMOs likely deploy both conventional and 
contentious actions to achieve their aims, depending on the specific IGO they are engaging with. 
It is the importance of specific IGOs in determining engagement strategy that is of interest in this 
research. 
Social movement organizing is flexible and adaptive, such that groups do not base decision 
making on ideological grouping, but rather the specific advantages and disadvantages of an 
opportunity. Meaning, a TSMO categorized as rejectionist is likely critical of established politics. 
Yet, the chance to have input on a meaningful and relevant treaty may be important enough to their 
goals that they are willing to work with an IGO to do so. Because of the flexibility of TSMO work, 
the notion of strategic engagement is not exclusively demonstrated in pragmatic TSMOs. 
Rejectionist and multilateralist TSMOs also weigh decisions in this way and may move between 
these categories depending on available opportunities. But, for the sake of this research, strategic 
engagement is explicitly demonstrated in TSMOs categorized as pragmatic in that we can see the 
limited ties they maintain and to what IGOs these ties are reported. This allows us to analyze what 
IGOs offer to TSMOs and how this engagement helps TSMOs achieve their aims. 
To understand the type of opportunities that IGOs provide TSMOs, I return to the 
distinction of operational vs. deliberative put forward by Smith et al. (2020). Again, deliberative 
IGOs operate more generally and do not require commitments from members. Deliberative IGOs 
are designed to aid national responses to emerging challenges and contribute to consensus building 
around global norms (Smith et al. 2020). Deliberative IGOs are usually where treaties and 
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conventions are initiated, based upon generalized norms surrounding the issue. On the other hand, 
operational IGOs include international conventions and treaty monitoring bodies, which require 
specific legal commitments from states. Without a transnational state, treaty compliance is difficult 
to enforce. TSMOs play an important role in this way, as their ability to draw international attention 
to governments’ treaty violations helps enforce treaty compliance (Smith et al. 2020). So, TSMOs 
gain access to resources and data through participating in compliance mechanisms.  
From these two types of IGOs, we can begin to theorize opportunities that IGOs provide 
TSMOs. We saw the propensity of environmental groups to maintain relationships with 
operational IGOs because these relationships provide access to enforceable policy and compliance 
information (Smith et al. 2020). On the other hand, while environmental groups appeared to partner 
with deliberative IGOs less often, it is suggested by our understanding of multilateralists, that 
TSMOs are interested in deliberative IGOs to participate in more general global norm building. 
From this I propose two categories of opportunities that IGOs offer to TSMOs based upon pressure 
from activists to include social movements in global politics.  
First, based upon the relationships demonstrated between operational IGOs and TSMOs I 
suggest the category of access. I considered access opportunities to be opportunities that provided 
TSMOs with resources, information or networks they would not otherwise have. I also suggest the 
category of influence based upon deliberative IGOs and more generally the appeal of international 
governance in the absence of a transnational state. I considered influence opportunities to include 
opportunities that allow TSMOs to have a say in the operations of IGOs, either through feedback 
mechanisms, the ability to participate in planning events or similar opportunities. While this binary 
provides a theoretical basis, I do not suspect that the categories of influence and access correspond 
to the deliberative vs. operative nature of IGOs. Rather these general categories capture the range 
21 
of opportunities provided by both types of IGOs. The specifics of these categories were developed 
in my data collection and there are more details on the procedure available in the following chapter.  
Past research on environmental activism has demonstrated the constantly evolving nature 
of the environmental movement, as activists are developing strategies in real time to political, 
social, economic and environmental changes. We have seen the consistent failure of actors too 
embedded in the global capitalist system and the solutions they put forward, such that there is 
momentum towards global justice-oriented climate action that challenges the underlying causes of 
the crises and works to urgently mitigate the worst effects of warming. The role of social 
movements in leading this action is unquestionable given the role such groups have had in not only 
advancing climate action but bringing attention to the connection between the capitalist 
globalization of our political and economic systems and the climate crisis.  
However, the hegemonic hold of global capitalist logic and the current mechanisms of 
international governance have historically and continue to emphasize the importance of nation 
state leadership over the expertise and experience of TSMOs. Effective climate action depends on 
the involvement of social movement groups being able to advance ‘true solutions’ as opposed to 
those based upon carbon markets and offsets (Bond 2010). This is the area of literature to which 
my research seeks to contribute. Understanding how TSMOs and IGOs currently interact and relate 
to one another sheds light on the larger power dynamics at play in determining how we may 
address the climate crisis.  While I specifically focus on TSMOs categorized as rejectionist and 
pragmatic, the conclusions of how TSMOs are choosing to interact with IGOs and what motivates 
this engagement is relevant beyond the academic categories. Rather, I argue an understanding of 
why TSMOs engage with particular IGOs will advance our understanding of the ability of 
international governance to advance radical social movement led solutions.  
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3.0 Methodology 
3.1 Data Collection: TSMOs  
3.1.1 Source 
For all data collection related to TSMOs I used the Yearbook of International 
Organizations. The Yearbook is published by The Union of International Associations and 
contains data on 73,000 international organizations, both IGOs and NGOs. The print versions of 
the Yearbook are updated yearly. The data for the Yearbooks are gathered year-round by soliciting 
organizations for updated information. The Yearbook reports that, on average, the response rate is 
about 35%, so profiles for organizations that do not provide updated information are supplemented 
by editors with information from websites, annual reports and similar documents (Union of 
International Associations). The IGO relationships reported by TSMOs refers to both formal 
relationships statuses, such as consultative status, as well as informal reported relationships. This 
information is available in two sections of the yearbook entries. “Consultative Status” refers to 
formal relationships and “IGO Relations” refers to informal relationships. Both categories were 
included in the count of ties to IGOs 
3.1.2 Organizations of Interest 
Drawing from Smith and her colleagues’ dataset on all transnational SMOs active as late 
as 2013, I selected the subset of environmental TSMOs that were categorized as environmental in 
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2013. From this, I selected all environmental TSMOs categorized as rejectionist or pragmatist and 
then collected additional data on all groups that were initially or that later became (according to 
Smith et al.’s coding) pragmatist or rejectionist for the years 2015, 2017 and 2019. Recognizing 
that the categorization of environmental is somewhat arbitrary, I used Smith et al.’s classification 
(Smith et al. 2020), which includes organizations focused on climate change, conservation, 
pollution, animal rights as well as those with environmental goals in regard to peace, development, 
human rights, third world debt abolition, food sovereignty and anti-consumerism. 
3.1.3 Focus of Analysis  
For all of these organizations, I collected data on the number of ties a TSMO reports to 
IGOs and NGOs and any available information on finances. If listed, I recorded the IGOs to which 
organizations reported ties. Additionally, I verified the data Smith and team collected on these 
organizations related to primary aim, founding year and headquarter location. Because these 
attributes are not expected to change, I only verified them for the 2015 data collection and my 
results were consistent with the data as of 2013. Relationships with IGOs were quantified as the 
number of relationships TSMOs report. I also coded additional variables for attributes of IGOs. I 
used dummy variables to express the operational1 (0) or deliberative 2(1) nature of IGOs. I also 
coded headquarter location as a binary, between the global south (0) and global north (1), following 
 
1 Operational refers to “international conventions and treaty monitoring bodies, which reflect specific legal 
commitments of states, and may involve routinized mechanisms for monitoring government compliance with 
international agreements” (Smith et al. 2020, 5) 
2 Deliberative refers to “UN agencies and programmes, which operate with more generalized mandates, and do not 
require specific policy commitments from members” (Smith et al. 2020, 5) 
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the procedure as used by Smith and team. I collected data on budget amounts and funding sources 
when provided to be used in future research.  
3.1.4 Analytical Approach  
The analysis of TSMOs can be broken down into two sections. First, I identified trends 
across the timeframe of 2015-2019. Specifically, I analyzed the number of organizations that 
reported differing numbers of ties to IGOs. The second portion is dedicated to analyzing how basic 
attributes influence the engagement strategies of TSMOs. I did this analysis separately for each 
year. I used variables related to the age, location, primary aim and NGO connectivity to understand 
how these attributes relate to engagement strategies. I used basic statistics to determine the 
significance of these trends.  
3.2 Data Collection: International Governance Organizations 
3.2.1 Organizations of Interest 
I defined the sample of IGOs based upon those to which that TSMOs report ties. Not every 
TSMO listed their ties explicitly, so this sample is limited in that it does not reflect all the 
relationships that environmental TSMOs maintain with IGOs. Beyond a simple lack of reporting, 
the political environment of international climate politics is complex and fluid such that TSMOs 
and IGOs are brought together in new and unanticipated ways that may not qualify as relationships 
reported to the Yearbook. For example, many IGOs allow for ‘informal relationships’ that can be 
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extensive yet are not necessarily reflected in this data. Because of this limitation, the sample of 
IGOs likely only represents more significant relationships or those which TSMOs felt comfortable 
reporting. To ensure the significance of the IGOs I analyzed, I only recorded information on IGOs 
that were reported by at least two TSMOs. This helped ensure that the IGOs are relevant within 
the broader environmental movement as opposed to the specific interest of an individual TSMO. 
3.2.2 Focus of Analysis  
I collected data on all 29 IGOs reported by at least two TSMOs. I read through these IGOs’ 
mission statement and policies relevant to TSMOs in order to gather information on the resources 
and opportunities they provide TSMOs.  I collected information on basic attributes of the IGO, 
similar to the information collected on TSMOs. Specifically, I recorded the founding year, 
headquarter location, primary aim and operational vs. deliberative nature of the organization. I also 
recorded dummy variables to capture affiliation with significant multilateral organizations, namely 
the UN, EU and World Bank. Additionally, I coded a dummy variable for independent IGOs, 
referring to IGOs not affiliated with one of the identified multilateral organizations. Similar to how 
these attributes were used to understand how historic dynamics influence TSMO behavior, it was 
thought that location, primary aim and proximity to larger organizations may influence the 
resources and opportunities IGOs are able to provide. 
3.2.3 Analytical Approach  
To gather this data, I consulted resources provided by the IGOs. All of the actors I studied 
maintain websites. I gathered basic information related to their location and founding year from 
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the About Us section of these websites. To gather information on the primary aim of actors, I 
consulted the first sentences of their home page or About Us page. For operational actors, 
specifically UN treaties and Conventions, I consulted the Role of the Secretariat in order to record 
the primary aim. This information can be relied upon due to the visibility of these areas of the 
website. Websites have become the most important means of communication between 
organizations and their audience (Ash et al. 2012). In this way, it is expected that these pages 
reflect the most up to date information on these organizations.  
Gathering information on the policies towards engagement with TSMOs was less 
straightforward. Most IGOs had a subsection of the website devoted to partnership. The 
partnership subsection was housed under titles about the IGO’s work such as, Our Work, What We 
Do, Where We Work and similar phrases, which was usually the second or third subsection after 
About Us. Within the partnership subsection, I gathered information from the Nongovernmental 
Partners/Actors or Civil Society Actors section. This page usually provided some information on 
the opportunities available through partnership and admission requirements. While the titles 
nongovernmental partners and civil society refers to a larger category of organization than that of 
TSMO, in most cases, it was the most relevant information available. 
However, I only relied upon the information on the partnership page of these websites if a 
Guide to Partnership was not available. The guides for partnership varied in their exact title but 
they were usually linked as a pdf at the bottom of the Partnership page or provided in a side 
heading under a title such as For Civil Society Organizations. These guides provided much more 
detailed explanations of the opportunities available through partnership, the different levels of 
partnership available and the exact protocols for application and admission requirements. 
Additionally, because this information was written for civil society organizations and was usually 
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not displayed in a format for the more general audience, I expected it to be more reflective of the 
true nature of these relationships.  
For every opportunity or resource provided I categorized it as either an influence or access 
opportunity. There was a large overlap in institutionalized opportunities, with the majority of IGOs 
providing the same types of opportunities. From this list, I identified more general categories to 
capture the range of opportunities provided by the identified IGOs. For influence opportunities, 
my 6 identified opportunities explicitly capture all of the opportunities noted in my data collection. 
However, there was a bit more variation in the access opportunities. Some IGOs were able to 
provide meeting spaces, access to libraries and grounds passes among many other varied resources. 
This range could only be effectively captured by the factor “other resources”.  
 I considered influence opportunities to include the opportunity for established sustainable 
relationships, representation of social movements in the IGO and the ability to provide feedback 
through lobbying as well as participating in events. Participation in events primarily refers to 
participation in general conferences in which TSMOs are able to submit written and oral 
statements. Participation in more significant events or meetings such as workshops or pre-
conference meetings was captured in the notion of providing feedback. This is made more explicit 
in the scoring scheme at the end of the chapter. I considered access opportunities to be the ability 
to attend events and meetings, have networking opportunities, organize events, and access data, 
meeting spaces, networking information and other similar resources.  
For the analysis of the ties, attributes of interest refer to the general category of 
opportunities. Some attributes of interest have 2 possible points due to the wide range of 
opportunities relevant to the attribute. For each possible point I used a guiding question and 
acceptable response to determine the assignment of points. For each IGO I consider all of the 
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questions for each attribute of interest, assigning points accordingly. The points for each attribute 
of interest are then added together to provide an overall score for each IGO. Below I provide the 
tables reflecting this scoring scheme. However, the appendix holds the explicit scoring for each 
IGO. With these scores I was able to use regression to analyze the influence of different 
characteristics on the way that actors behave towards TSMOs. This also allowed me to identify 
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Table 2 Scoring Guide for Access Opportunities 
Attribute of 
Interest 
Attend Events TSMO Events TSMO Events 
Access to Information 
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Based upon the analysis as outlined in Chapter 3, my results are split into discussions of 
TSMOs and the IGOs with which they report ties. By splitting the analysis, I am better able to 
describe trends and development in each population of organizations. Chapter 5 then builds upon 
these ideas and explicitly discusses the relationships between these two types of actors. This 
chapter begins with a discussion of TSMOs, how they have developed over the time frame 2015-
2019 and attributes of importance in understanding their behavior towards established interstate 
politics. I then discuss the IGOs these TSMOs report ties to, analyzing the factors that make these 
actors appealing partners and ultimately the potential these relationships hold for advancing radical 
climate solution. 
4.1 TSMOs 
The analysis of TSMOs suggests that organizations’ behavior and strategies are responding 
in real time to global and regional political and economic developments. However, past research 
has suggested that using basic attributes of TSMOs to predict behavior also demonstrates that the 
age and primary aim of TSMOs influences the strategies they deploy. This tension is at the heart 
of this analysis, as I try to make sense of how organizations constrained by global institutional and 
power structures can intervene strategically to advance counterhegemonic agendas. In this section, 
I outline both the ways this TSMO network has changed over the time frame 2015-2019 as well 
as discuss the attributes that may influence their strategies more generally. 
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4.1.1 Trends 2015-2019  
 
While the time period of interest is short, it is still important to understand how behavior 
and strategies of TSMOs may have changed in response to significant developments and changing 
political realities during the latter half of the 2010 decade. This research analyzes hypotheses 
developed over longitudinal studies of TSMOs and places these ideas in the context of a more 
volatile time in world history. A combination of decreased American influence abroad, increases 
in volatility within the US, the long-term impacts of the 2008 financial crisis and more general 
trends of growing inequality, social unrest and the growing impacts of climate change have made 
the past decade unprecedented in international politics and the effects on social movement 
organizing are not yet fully understood.  
Politically, the number of organizations classified as rejectionist or pragmatist decreased 
from 223 to 204. Every year between 12-15 rejectionist and pragmatist TSMOs became 
categorized as multilateralist, while the number of multilateralist that became categorized as 
rejectionist or pragmatist during this frame was only 2. A few TSMOs became inactive or did not 
report enough data for individual years, thus being categorized as blank, but for the most part it 
appears that more TSMOs were increasingly practicing multilateralist behavior. The proportion of 
TSMOs categorized as rejectionist vs pragmatist remained consistent throughout this time frame 
with a range of 2-10 TSMOs switching between these classifications each year. However, my 
research only tracked groups that existed as of 2013 so it is possible that new rejectionist and 
pragmatist could have been founded during this period. This is a concern future research could 
address. 
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Meanwhile, connectivity with NGOs increased. The average number of connections 
TSMOs reported during this time frame increased from 2.67 in 2015 to 3.05 in 2019, with 2017 in 
the middle at 2.97. I examined subsets of the general population based on basic attributes like 
location, age and primary aim. There was no large divergence in these subgroups between the 
years, with these attributes demonstrating similar influences throughout the time frame. Chi-square 
test suggested that the discrepancies between years was not significant. However, when viewed in 
light of the political developments over this short time frame, the increase in general connectivity 
(to IGOs and NGOs) is important in understanding how TSMOs may be responding to the current 
political reality, with connectivity and relationships with actors that prioritize some notion of 
democracy as more appealing in light of the growth of nationalist populism and the threat of 21st 
century fascism (Robison, 2014).  
4.1.2 Influential Attributes  
To understand what influences the strategic choices of TSMOs, I examined the influence 
of basic attributes of TSMOs. Geographic location, age, primary aim, and connectivity to other 
NGOs. By considering the counts and averages of subsets of the overall sample, it is possible to 
gain an understanding of how these attributes influence the political strategies of TSMOs.  
The location of TSMOs was coded to assign values based upon headquarters location in 
the global south or global north. The number of TSMOs headquartered in the global south ranged 
from 57-62 throughout the timeframe, comprising about 25% of the total number of TSMOs. Of 
TSMOs located in the global south, 29-35 organizations (50.8-58.3%) exhibited rejectionist 
behavior compared to below 50% for TSMOs based in the global north. There is considerable 
correlation between the variables related to location and age, with higher proportion of TSMOs 
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headquartered in the global south founded after 1989, which as explained earlier, is a crucial year, 
as the end of the cold war, in the global political order. The age of the organization was split into 
two groups: those founded before or after 1989. In younger organizations, for those founded after 
1989, 47-50% of TSMOs demonstrated rejectionist behavior. This proportion was about 46% for 
TSMOs founded before 1989. 
Table 3: Primary Aims 
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The primary aims of the TSMOs were classified into four categories: environmental, 
environmental and social (abbreviated as environmental+), global justice and other. The table 
above explains the specifics of each category. Of TSMOs primarily concerned with environmental 
matters 48-51 (44.95-50.5%) were rejectionist. Those with a broader environmental focus 
(environmental+) were 37.3 - 46% rejectionist. Finally, those dedicated to a broad focus of global 
justice were 50 - 53.8% rejectionist. This trend, with global justice organizations representing the 
highest proportion of rejectionist TSMOs is consistent with how we expected such aims to 
influence behavior. The difference between an exclusively environmental and more broadly 
environmental focus was smaller but still apparent, suggesting that the broader focus of 
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environmental and social issues may encourage TSMOs to engage with IGOs due to the broader 
nature of their work. These trends support the findings of research conducted by Smith et al. (2020) 
with TSMOs founded after 1989 and TSMOs headquartered in the global south as more likely to 
be categorized as rejectionist. Additionally, in these years we saw that among TSMOs categorized 
as environmental+ there was a lower proportion of rejectionist TSMOs, while TSMOs categorized 
as global justice had a higher proportion of rejectionists.  
Table 4 Environmental TSMOs Attributes (frequencies and standard deviations) 
 2015 2017 2019 
Pragmatist 116 (47%)  
       0.500 
114 (49%) 
     0.5 
108 (48%) 
      0.500 
Founded after 1989 94 (38%) 
       0.48 
78 (33%) 
     0.47 
74 (33%) 
     0.47 
HQ Global South 58 (23.5) 
      0.42 
62 (26.5) 
     0.44 
62 (28%) 




      0.5 
116 (49.5%) 
      0.501 
115 (51%) 




     0.475 
69 (29.5%) 
      0.459 
71 (31.5%) 




     0.32 
32 (14%) 
     0.331 
26 (11.5) 
     0.302 
Other Primary Aim  16 (6.5) 
     0.246 
18 (7.5) 
      0.269 
16 (7%) 
       0.254 
Total number 247 233 225 
 
Overall, this sample of TSMOs averaged about 2.8 connections to NGOs, but this number 
ranged widely with some TSMOs reporting 20+ connections. Rejectionist and pragmatism groups 
appeared to maintain relatively similar number of connections. TSMOs headquartered in the global 
south reported slightly more connections than those in the global north, as did younger TSMOs, 
though these differences were small. One TSMO, the Ban Terminator Campaign reported 45 ties 
to NGOs, while the other reported numbers were below 20. Removing the Ban Terminator 
Campaign lowers the overall average to 2.58 and suggests a larger difference between the averages 
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for rejectionist and pragmatist TSMOs, with rejectionist averaging around 2.4 and pragmatist 
averaging about 2.8, such that we see a slight correlation between connections to NGOs and IGOs. 
My analysis on the attributes and engagement strategies of environmental TSMOs over 
this time frame strongly support the longitudinal findings of Smith et al. (2020). However, to build 
upon these findings, we must not only further support the pragmatic strategies of environmental 
TSMOs but also try to understand why this pragmatism is advantageous and why some 
environmental TSMOs continue to engage with international governance despite strong critiques 
of such institutions from the environmental movement. In Smith et al.’s research on the categories 
of multilateralist and rejectionist, environmental groups complicated this binary, not clearly 
demonstrating rejectionist or multilateralist behavior, thus forcing the introduction of the idea of 
pragmatist. For TSMOs focused on other issues, the attributes of location and age appeared to 
serve as a proxy for ideological alignment, thus influencing how TSMOs engaged with 
international governance. However, the pragmatic engagement of environmental TSMOs appears 
to suggest that ideology cannot fully explain how and when TSMOs decide to engage with IGOs. 
Rather, a TSMO’s choice to deploy rejectionist versus pragmatist behavior may instead rely upon 
the TSMO’s specific framing or understanding of their goals, the IGOs that work in their field, 
and the opportunities that exist in relationships with those IGOs.  
4.2 IGOs 
The conclusions of the previous section suggest that factors besides TSMO attributes must 
play a part in determining why TSMOs may engage with IGOs despite demonstrated criticality of 
international politics. So, as explained in the methodology chapter, I next examined IGOs to 
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understand how the specific opportunities offered in these relationships may affect engagement 
strategies of TSMOs. I analyzed IGOs to which more than one environmental TSMO reported ties. 
This resulted in 29 actors of interest. However, I was only able to fully gather data on 24 of the 29 
actors. I include information on all 29 in my discussion of counts and averages when possible. 
While only 29 IGOs were reported by two or more TSMOs, 168 IGOs were reported by at least 
one. This large difference in the number IGOs reported by one TSMO and the number reported by 
at least two suggests there is high level of specificity within the population of IGOs such that there 
is only a small number of IGOs that are more generally appealing to a range of TSMOs. 
Of the 29 IGOs reported by at least two TSMOs, 51.7% were affiliated with the UN and 
20.6% affiliated with the EU. The remaining roughly 30% of IGOs were categorized as 
independent. Independent refers to organizations not affiliated with the UN, EU or other national 
governments. The Helsinki Commission as a US government agency was an exception to these 
categories.  About 24% of the IGOs were headquartered in the global south and close to 35% 
were considered young, founded after 1989. Additionally, about a quarter of these actors were 
considered operational. As for the primary aim, I added a few categories to those used to categorize 
TSMOs. Governance as a primary aim referred to regional or global organizations that uphold 
political agreements and agendas, such as the European Commission. Development as a primary 
aim captured IGOs working on economic and infrastructure development, such as the UNDP. 
Peace/Human Rights as a category referred to IGOs working globally to maintain peace and protect 
human rights, such as the UNHCR. Environment and environmental+ are defined in the same way 
as in the analysis of TMSOs’ primary aims. The categories are mutually exclusive. There is a 
roughly proportional distribution among the five categories, with environmentally focused IGOs 
representing the largest portion. 
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Figure 1 Primary Aims of IGOs 
4.2.1 The Opportunities  
Overall, I found that on average political actors provided 2.069/6 influence opportunities 
and 2.034/5 access opportunities, combined to average 4.103/11. IGOs provided less of total 
influence opportunities than access opportunities. However, there was a wide range in the 
percentage of IGOs that provided each opportunity. For influence opportunities, the percentage of 
IGOs that provided opportunities ranged from 16% (for the ability to lobby decision makers) to 
83% (for ability to provide feedback). There is a similar discrepancy in access opportunities, 
though the range was a bit smaller, from 20% (for TSMOs to be able to organize their own events) 
to 67% (for opportunity to access information). This wide range appears to be due to the 
significance of the opportunity or resource. For example, 83% of IGOs provide the opportunity to 
provide feedback through online mechanisms or specific events but only 25% of IGOs provide 
the opportunity to provide feedback in planning sessions or during planning phases of operations. 
Similarly, we see that IGOs are willing to provide informational resources to TSMOs, through the 
high proportion of actors that invite TSMOs to attend events, and that are willing to share data. 
However, resources designed specifically for TSMOs—such as those that require additional work 






Primary Aim (in %)
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or resources beyond the IGO’s primary function, such as organizing TSMO networking events or 
allowing TSMOs to organize events at conferences—are less commonly provided.  
In this way, the IGOs provided more basic influence and access opportunities in high 
proportions but did not offer more substantial opportunities as often. This is expected, as IGOs 
likely want to minimize the amount of time and resources they deploy to the support of TSMOs 
while still publicly appearing supportive of local struggles and civil society generally. However, 
because these IGOs were reported by at least two TSMOs during this timeframe we can see that 
the opportunities and resources provided may still be telling of how engagement may be 
strategically advantageous, especially when discussed in the context of case studies. 
 
Figure 2 Influence Opportunities Percent Provided 
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Are there established relationship roles for social
movement organizations with a clear means to achieving
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Are there permanent positions in the organization held by
social movement organizations representatives?
Are social movement organizations able to provide
feedback to partner?
Is there a way to provide feedback in the planning of
operations?
Can social movement organizations speak/ submit written
comments at events?
Can social movement organizations lobby decision makers?




Figure 3 Access Opportunties Percent Provided 
Operational IGOs appeared to preform slightly worse than deliberative IGOs (4.5 vs. 4.61). 
Deliberative IGOs provided more access opportunities than influence opportunities, while 
operational IGOs provided more influence opportunities than access opportunities. Organizations 
headquartered in the global south and organizations founded before 1989 provided slightly more 
opportunities. The influence of actor affiliation appeared to be more significant, with the UN 
affiliated IGOs out preforming EU affiliated and independent IGOs. Noteworthy is the low 
performance of EU affiliated actors. The primary aim of the IGO also appeared to be important. 
Environmentally focused IGOs averaged the lowest, while multi-issue IGOs, such as those focused 
on human rights or development, all scored relatively high.  
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Figure 4 Provision of Opportunities by IGO Primary Aim 
4.2.2 Modeling:  
I preformed cross validated stepwise linear regression, with all three influence, access and 
total as response variables in three independent models. I built the models with founding year, 
primary aim, actor affiliation, type of actor (operational vs. deliberative) and location as predictors 
and the number of provided opportunities as the response. Stepwise regression preforms variable 
selection, generating models based on the number of variables that optimize prediction accuracy 
and therefore identify the most important variables. These stepwise generated models performed 
well with two of the models reporting R squared values above 0.80. Notably, the Access model 












Influence of Primary Aim 




Total             R squared=.824 
(Intercept)                UN                  EU  
   2.750000           3.183333        -1.416667  
 
Influence              R squared=.98 
(Intercept)                 UN                  Envi  
  0.7459334        2.3710302        0.3113865  
 
Access                R squared=.4747 
 (Intercept)               `Founding year`              UN                  EU                 Envi              `Envi+`  
    27.81139382           -0.01319692          0.99562526     -0.75175388     -0.37498227.      -0.03547629  
Table 5 Modeling Coefficients 
 
The model for the total number of opportunities provided suggests UN affiliated IGOs 
provide more opportunities while EU affiliated IGOs provide fewer. The model for influence 
opportunities also suggests the positive influence of UN affiliation. Notably, the primary aim of 
environmental was also noted as positively significant. The model for access opportunities was 
less significant and built upon several more variables. Again, there is the positive influence of UN 
affiliation. However, this model suggests the negative influence of founding year, such that 
younger organizations provided fewer access opportunities. Notably, this model also suggested a 
slightly negative influence of environmental and environmental+ primary aims.  
Together, these models suggest the significance of UN affiliation in the provision of 
opportunities. This can be understood as both a product of the ideological alignment of the UN as 
well as the UN’s access to resources. The positive influence of environment as a primary aim on 
influence opportunities suggests that environmental IGOs seek the input of TSMOs within the 
environmental movement in their operations. However, the negative influence of environmental 
Provided Opportunities= β0 + β1Founding Year + β2HQ Location + β3Type(UN) + 
β4Type(EU)+β5Type (World Bank)+ β6Type (Indep.) + β7Primary Aim(Envi.)+ β8 Primary 
Aim (Envi.+) + β9 Primary Aim (Human Rights) + β10Primary Aim (Develop.) + β11Primary 
Aim (Governance) + β12Operational 
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focus on access opportunities suggests that environmental IGOs are not able or willing to provide 
resources to TSMOs.  
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5.0 Relationships between IGOs and TSMOs 
To supplement my quantitative analysis in the previous chapter I conducted a select few 
case studies to see how these dynamics identified in my statistical analysis manifest in real 
relationships between TSMOs and IGOs. I conducted three extensive case studies on the IGOs that 
scored the lowest and highest in regard to total influence and access opportunities provided to 
TSMOs. This more detail-oriented discussion allows for the previous chapter’s findings to 
contribute to an argument about how TSMOs are engaging with IGOs and how these relationships 
contribute to our understanding of social movement led climate action. 
5.1 Case Studies 
5.1.1 International Whaling Commission 
The International Whaling Commission (IWC) was the IGO with the lowest total score (1) 
for which I was able to gather sufficient information. The only provided resource appeared to be 
publicly available research reports. However, the literature surrounding the IWC does suggest that 
in certain circumstances TSMOs may be able to attend events, though I did not find this in my 
own exploration of the IWC’s policies (Andresen and Skodvin 2008).  
The IWC was founded in 1946 and is located in Cambridge, England. It is considered an 
independent agency, dedicated to “the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus making 
possible the orderly development of the whaling industry.” For this, the actor is considered an 
environmentally focused IGO. The IWC started as a group of whaling nations working to better 
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communicate and maintain whale stocks. However, advocacy work by environmentalists and 
conservation organizations successfully encouraged other nations to join, creating a majority of 
anti-whaling nations in the commission (Andresen and Skodvin 2008). This led to a moratorium 
on all whaling, except for limited hunting by indigenous communities in the 1980’s (Andresen and 
Skodvin 2008). This has been strongly criticized by pro-whaling nations who cite that current 
whale stocks could be sustainably hunted (Andresen and Skodvin 2008). While some whaling 
countries have left the IWC over the moratorium, there is still pressure to keep the commission 
active due to past depletions of whale stocks. The role of NGOs and more specifically TSMOs in 
the expansion of nation states included in the commission and adoption of the moratorium is 
significant and has been extensively studied by scholars (Andresen and Skodvin 2008). The 
environmental movement’s influence in the IWC was seen both in domestic relationships (social 
movements lobbied anti-whaling governments to join the commission) and international lobbying 
(lobbying- formally or informally- decision makers of IWC through a range of means).  
In 2015, seven TSMOs reported relationships to the IWC. This number dropped to five for 
both 2017 and 2019.  These five TSMOs (Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, International 
Dolphin Watch, International Primate Protection League, Nordic Council for Animal Welfare, 
World Council of Whalers) reported this relationship for all three years. Only two of these 
organizations (Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition and International Primate Protection 
League) reported relationships to other IGOs. These two TSMOs were also the only ones to report 
ties to NGOs as well (4 and 6, respectively). None of the TSMOs have headquarters in the global 
south and only one was founded after 1989. In this way the age cohort of the IWC corresponds 
with the age of the TSMOs.  
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Four of the TSMOs are dedicated explicitly to the arctic region or animal rights, such that 
one assumes they work to influence nation states to adopt anti-whaling positions. Their views are 
consistent with the groups which first influenced the membership composition of the IWC. The 
World Council of Whalers, dedicated to the social and economic issues surrounding whaling, 
likely advocates for pro-whaling that is monitored and sustainable. Though these stances are 
different, it appears that all of these organizations may have the same motivation in partnering 
with the IWC, which is to be able to influence the actor to enact policies consistent with their 
beliefs, even in the absence of provide influence opportunities. 
5.1.2 UNCCD  
The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) was one of two IGOs 
with an overall score of 9 out of 11. The UNCCD provided 5 influence opportunities and 4 access 
opportunities, only not providing the explicit opportunity to lobby decision makers and the 
provision of additional resources beyond information. Organizations are able to apply for observer 
status with the UNCCD and can hold positions within the convention through the CSO panel. The 
UNCCD allows observer organizations to attend and participate in events and also supports TSMO 
organized events.  
The UNCCD was founded in 1994 as “the sole legally binding international agreement 
linking environment and development to sustainable land management” (UNCCD). The 
Convention specifically focuses on drylands, working to restore the productivity of degraded land 
to improve the sustainability of livelihoods in these regions. The headquarters of the convention is 
in Bonn Germany. The convention is made up of 197 members states and meets at rotating 
locations for its annual Conference of the Parties.  
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Between 2015-2019, seven TSMOs reported ties to UNCCD: Confederation of 
Environmental and Development NGOs of Central Africa, Esquel Group Foundation, International 
Association for Forest Resources Management, International Circle for the Promotion of Creation, 
International Court of the Environment Foundation, Indigenous Peasant Office of Central 
American Community Forestry and the Caribbean Youth Environment Network. Six TSMOs 
reported the relationship in 2015 and 2017 respectively but only 2 TSMOs (Confederation of 
Environmental and Development NGOs of Central Africa, Caribbean Youth Environment 
Network) reported the tie in 2019. This was due to a combination of TSMOs reporting more ties 
to TSMOs so as to be qualified as multilateralists and thus not considered in this population as 
well as several TSMOs not providing data for the 2019 data collection. Because of this the only 
TSMO to report a relationship with the UNCCD for all three years was the Confederation of 
Environmental and Development NGOs of Central Africa. Of these seven TSMOs, two were 
founded before 1989 (in 1984 and 1986 respectively) and five were headquartered in the global 
south. Only one of the TSMOs was categorized as having an exclusively environmental focus 
while the other six others were categorized as environmental+, focusing on social and 
environmental issues.  
While the UNCCD scored highly in my analysis, literature surrounding the Convention 
suggests these provided opportunities do not necessarily capture the entire picture. It has been 
argued that “the civil society interface mechanism established in the context of the UNCCD, was 
in fact captured early on by intermediary NGOs” (McKeon 2013, p. 7). These NGOs then resisted 
the involvement of organizations that truly represented the people most effected by desertification. 
The UNCCD supported the NGOs, which McKeon suggests may have been due to the 
Convention’s preference to deal with NGOs over “potentially more problematic people’s 
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organizations” (McKeon 2013, p. 7). This ultimately led to the most relevant actors in the 
movement, small farmers and herder organizations, working outside of the UNCCD (McKeon 
2013, p. 7).  
This contrast brings up the important point that while my research suggests the UNCCD is 
providing meaningful opportunities, the accessibility of these opportunities is just as important. 
The relationships between TSMOs and IGOs are too complex to assume that the provision of 
opportunities directly correlates with a support of social movements. Elites are able to divide civil 
society actors in order to ensure that underlying economic struggles are obscured. Rather, as 
McKeon suggests, these opportunities may be provided but reserved for more formally established 
NGOs, as seen in the example of the UNCCD. The TSMOs identified over the years 2015-2019 
support the argument raised by McKeon in that the Confederation of Environmental and 
Development NGOs of Central Africa was the only group to report the tie for all three years. 
However, the inclusion of TSMOs like Indigenous Peasant Office of Central American 
Community Forestry and the Caribbean Youth Environment Network suggests that perhaps the 
UNCCD has begun work to be more inclusive in its partnerships since McKeon’s writing. It is also 
possible that the high number of access opportunities is attractive to TSMOs, in that though they 
may not be able to take strategic advantage of influence opportunities, networking opportunities 
and access to information is still useful in their work.  
5.1.3 Food and Agriculture Organization 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was the other IGO with the highest overall 
score (9). The FAO provided 3 out of the 4 possible access opportunities and 4 out of the 6 possible 
influence opportunities. TSMOs are able to apply for special statuses with the FAO that grants 
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them the ability to attend and participate in events and meetings. These special relationships also 
allow representatives from TSMOs to obtain roles in the FAO thorough the Committee on 
Relations with International Organizations. The FAO is located in Rome, Italy and was founded 
in 1945. It is a specialized agency of the UN focused on hunger and food security. With half of the 
organization’s eight departments devoted explicitly to the environment, the FAO is categorized as 
having an environmental+ focus. The organization works to ensure access to nutrition and well-
being, while also concerning itself with the sustainability of food production around the world.   
Over the 2015-2019 timeframe, 3-4 TSMOs reported relationships with the FAO. Only two 
of these organizations reported the relationship for all three years (International Movement for the 
Defense of and Right to Pleasure, World Forum of Fisher People). The International Social and 
Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance, Network for Voluntary Development in 
Asia, Asia Pacific Mountain Network and Genetic Resources Action all reported the relationship 
for one year only. All of the TSMOs were founded in 1989 or later. Two of them, Asia Pacific 
Mountain Network and World Forum of Fisher People are headquartered in the global south. The 
Asia Pacific Mountain Network and World Forum of Fisher People was categorized as 
environmental+, while the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling 
Alliance was considered strictly environmental. The Network for Voluntary Development in Asia 
and Genetic Resources Action International were considered global justice focused. The remaining 
TSMOs were categorized as Other.  
While from the data I collected the FAO appears to offer many resources and opportunities, 
historically the organizations openness to TSMOs been inconsistent and varied even within the 
organization (Liese 2010). However, in recent years advocacy work on behalf of TSMOs has 
carved out meaningful space in the FAO that is potentially telling of future relationships between 
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TSMOs and IGOs (Mckeon 2015b). To discuss the FAO and the development of its stance towards 
TSMOs, there is no more significant actor than Via Campesina. While Via Campesina is 
categorized as a multilateralist, the significant work of this TSMO, and its particular relevance in 
the work of the FAO, makes it so it is worth discussing.  
Via Campesina is a global movement to establish food sovereignty based upon the practices 
of peasants and indigenous peoples around the world (McKeon 2015a). Their work stands in 
opposition to neoliberal food policy. Notably, the IMF, World Bank and WTO have propagated a 
globalization of our food system that has given control to a select few corporations while 
undermining local food production (McKeon 2015a). La Via Campesina has been crucial to 
critiques of this model and finding potential alternatives by working both outside of and with 
international governance, notably FAO. Within food politics, FAO has stood in contrast to 
transnational finance institutions due its more democratic set up and relative openness to 
engagement with civil society (McKeon 2015a).  
In 2002, La Via Campesina helped establish the International Planning Committee for Food 
Sovereignty to open up “political space for rural movements in global FAO forums and coaching 
them in how to occupy it effectively” (McKeon 2015a, p. 245). Following the 2007 global 
recession, this committee became the Committee of World Food Security, which is unprecedented 
in its recognition of expertise from TSMOs (McKeon 2015a). In fact, the committee was designed 
to foster “inclusively debated, paradigm-changing, normative guidance in which these 
constituencies (TSMOs) are full participants” (McKeon 2015a, p. 229). While there is still much 
room for progress within the Committee of World Food Security it represents how a governance 
system may be able to enforce guidance and promote coherent global policy while also uplifting 
the experiences of local, vulnerable people such that a diversity of strategies can flourish.  
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In this context, the high score of the FAO appears to truly reflect a prioritization of TSMOs, 
which contrasts the high score of the UNCCD. Both actors provide opportunities, but the FAO 
provides these opportunities in a way that is more accessible to the groups that critically need 
access. A notable difference between these IGOs is the way in which policies towards TSMOs 
were designed, with the FAO’s Committee on World Food Security coming out of advocacy work 
by TSMOs in the aftermath of the 2007 global recession as opposed to policies designed by IGOs 
for TSMOs.  
Additionally, the crucial role of La Via Campesina in this work is an example of how the 
categories necessary to conduct this research are arbitrary and that groups are constantly operating 
across our different categories to achieve their goals. While the number of ties that La Via 
Campesina reports suggests that the group is multilateralist, the work they do and the strategy 
behind it very much embodies strategic engagement in that operating both within and outside of 
established politics allows for groups to carve out meaningful space within established politics to 
further establish support for the work they are doing outside of established politics. This raises the 
question of whether further research that looks at the multilateralist category along the lines of this 
analysis can shed more light on how social movement groups are advancing radical change. 
5.2 Discussion  
Generalizing these case studies in conjunction with the previous quantitative analysis, 
allows us to discuss the engagement strategies of TSMOs. This discussion provides insight into 
the strategic advantage of specific engagement opportunities such that from this we can gain an 
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understanding of how TSMOs may advance radical climate action from within the established 
political order.  
5.2.1 Access Opportunities 
TSMOs may engage with IGOs to secure resources necessary for their operations. 
Immediately, it is evident that some access opportunities will not depend upon the particular actor, 
which is providing them, such that a TSMO seeking access to meeting space or other basic 
resources does not need to seek out particular IGOs in order to get these needs met but rather can 
partner with any IGO that provides these resources. As noted in the modeling of access 
opportunities, IGOs affiliated with UN were better able to provide resources while those affiliated 
with the EU as well as younger IGOs provided fewer access opportunities.   
On the other hand, there does appear to be a large portion of access opportunities that do 
depend on the significance of the actor. While resources like meeting spaces are useful regardless 
of who is providing them, resources like data, updated operational materials, networking 
opportunities and the ability to attend events depend heavily upon the importance of the IGO. Data 
and information on the operations of an IGO are obviously important when the work the IGO is 
doing is considered relevant to the work of the TSMO. The appeal of networking opportunities 
and events are also heavily reliant on the perceived relevance of the IGO. For example, the annual 
Conference of the Parties for the UNFCCC is a large, multiple week-long conference that brings 
together a diverse range of TSMO and other political actors from around the world working on a 
large range of issues relevant to climate action.  
The provision of access opportunities appears important in that there is not an alternative 
for securing resources in the same way that TSMOs are able to achieve influence through a variety 
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of methods. Rather, TSMOs pursue these particular engagements for the resources, such that in 
their absence there is less reason for the engagement. My research supports this idea in that all of 
the access opportunities were provided by at least 20% of IGOs and 3/5 were provided by over 
40%.  However, as seen in other research on TSMOs, basic resources within TSMO networks 
have greatly developed in recent years, such that there is not the same sort of dependence on the 
resources of established actors (Abbott et al. 2016). Rather, I argue that networking opportunities 
and access to information is far more likely to be useful than access to basic resources like meeting 
spaces.  
As seen in the UNCCD, FAO and UNFCCC, conferences bring together TSMOs working 
within the same field and provide them, some more than others, with the opportunity to meet, 
network and plan. While the World Social Forum has played an important role in providing 
TSMOs space to network without the influence of IGOs, civil society space within IGOs is likely 
also useful, especially among TSMOs that are interested in working with IGOs. A crucial element 
of the power of TSMOs to demand and use influence opportunities is the network that supports 
them outside of established politics. The work that happens through access opportunities is 
important for TSMOs to demonstrate and build the power of their movements. This puts TSMOs 
in better positions to demand accessible influence opportunities.  
 
5.2.2 Influence Opportunities 
 
TSMOs may engage with IGOs as to influence the actor to adopt certain policies or stances 
to see their own goals and ambitions achieved. However, solely the provision of influence 
opportunities may not be significant in and of itself. Rather, I argue there are three factors that are 
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relevant to TSMOs seeking to influence IGOs. First, is the provision of influence opportunities. 
As seen in the opportunities provided by the FAO, with actual space for TSMOs to share their 
expertise and voice their opinions, partnership with the FAO is appealing. However, as seen in the 
example of the UNCCD, as equally important to the provision of these opportunities is their 
accessibility. While UNCCD offers many of the same opportunities as the FAO, TSMOs have not 
had the same type of access to them. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the significance of 
the IGO in determining motivation. As an in the example of the IWC, we see TSMOs exerting 
influence even in the absence of provided influence opportunities. Because there are not many 
significant IGOs that work specifically on whaling, the IWC maintains particular importance in 
the operations of TSMOs that work on similar issues. This also appears to be the case with IGOs 
like the UNFCCC and other conventions on specific topics.  
The ability to establish a formal relationship with the actor, provide feedback, elect civil 
society representatives among other opportunities may dictate how easy it is for a TSMO to have 
influence in the operations of an IGO. However, the provision of these opportunities does not 
dictate how influential a TSMO can be in the operation of an IGO. For example, the IWC did not 
provide any of the influence opportunities and yet has been heavily influenced by the work of 
TSMOs, especially on the domestic stage (Andresen and Skodvin, 2003). TSMOs can influence 
actors through provided influence opportunities, access opportunities, outside of provided 
opportunities or some combination of these strategies. In the absence of civil society representation 
in leadership of an IGO, individual TSMOs can leverage their formal affiliation with the actor to 
advocate on behalf of particular issues. Additionally, TSMOs may be able to take advantage of 
access opportunities to influence actors. If an actor allows TSMOs to attend events but does not 
allow TSMOs to participate in events, TSMOs can show up in large numbers to demonstrate their 
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investment in the cause or the amount of attention a particular issue is attracting. In this way, the 
actual provision of factors is far less important than the perceived significance of the IGO in the 
work of the TSMO. 
As noted in the modeling in the previous chapter, IGOs with environmental primary aims 
provided more influence opportunities compared to IGOs with aims not focused on the 
environment. TSMOs can use access opportunities to build their networks and position themselves 
to better be able to carve out meaningful space in established politics. From this, TSMOs can then 
advocate for and pressure IGOs to provide influence opportunities. The positive influence of 
environmentally focused IGOs may suggest that the environmental movement has already begun 
to take advantage of this transitional period in international politics, as international governance 
organizations are forced to contend with their democratic legitimacy, to demand more 
opportunities to influence the operations of IGOs they seek to influence. However, this advocacy 
work appears to have two important stages: the provision of opportunities and the accessibility of 
these opportunities. So, while it is possible that environmental IGOs have begun to succumb to the 
pressure of providing more influence opportunities, the success of the Commission on World Food 









To summarize, my research contributes to an understanding of how TSMOs are developing 
strategies to exert influence in global climate action and a broader understanding of TSMOs’ 
ability to advance radical climate solutions within established politics. My findings support past 
findings that younger TSMOs and those located in the global south are more likely to operate 
outside of established politics, particularly relationships with UN programmes, as opposed to 
operational IGOs (Smith et al. 2020). However, I suggest that to understand when engagement 
with IGOs is advantageous to radical environmental groups we must look closely at the 
opportunities these IGOs provide as opposed to how ideological alignment may dictate strategy. 
Additionally, TSMOs with more general or broader primary aims (ie: Environmental+) appeared 
to be more often pragmatic than others. This supports past research and also suggests that a larger 
scope of work may necessitate more engagement with other actors, including IGOs.  
This idea is further supported by the behavior trends during the time period of 2015-2019. 
During these years there was an increase in overall connectivity, both with IGOs and among 
TSMOs. This can be seen as a response to a resurgence in nationalist populism threatening progress 
of climate action as well as our established democratic norms. From 2015-2019, as environmental 
TSMOs were forced to contend with larger obstacles than previous opposition to climate policy it 
is possible that relationships with IGOs allowed these groups to adequately respond to the 
increased threat of both regressive climate politics in significant countries like the US and Brazil 
as well as the threat of growing nationalist populism in many of these same nation states.  
However, I argue that broader focuses requiring increased connectivity does not take away 
from the potential development of a social movement lead solutions to the climate crisis. Instead, 
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I argue that the trends demonstrated in these relationships suggest that TSMOs are able to make 
use of engagement with IGOs to develop their networks, use these networks to demonstrate their 
power and with this gain more access to influence opportunities. TSMOs seeking access to 
resources will engage with IGOs based upon some combination of the opportunities provided and 
the significance of the actor. Important network building happens through events and conferences 
hosted by IGOs, such that TSMOs are in better position to engage with IGOs in a way that allows 
them to influence operations.  
TSMOs are less constrained by the actual provision of influence opportunities because they 
have a range of ways to enact influence and pressure on IGOs. However, to advance radial social 
movement led solutions within established politics, TSMOs advocate for both the provision of 
opportunities and maintained accessibility of these opportunities. Based upon this, advancing 
social movement led solutions within established politics depends upon the successful wins of 
spaces within significant IGOs. TSMOs, especially La Via Campesina worked to create a space 
within the FAO that prioritized their expertise and experiences. While IGOs like the UNCCD 
provide many opportunities without this same type of prioritization, the success of social 
movement advocacy to transform provided opportunities into meaningful relationships, is a 
hopeful sign that IGOs which currently provide nominal support of social movements may one 
day be pressured into providing actual space for TSMO solutions.  
While radical ideas are never propagated without cooption and pushback, if these spaces 
are set up as so to equally weigh the say of TSMOs and other actors, there is the potential for 
international politics to address the corporate influence and neoliberal logic that currently makes 
our democratic international institutions ineffective and unpromising tools for meaningful change. 
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Specifically, as seen in the success of the Committee on World Food Security, TSMO spaces ought 
to be designed and implemented by TSMOs, as opposed to designed by IGOs for TSMOs.  
In weighing the question of “Can advocacy within IGOs advance radical solutions or must 
activists find other ways to bring about meaningful change?” I argue that there is a way forward 
within international governance to advance radical solutions, but it is largely dependent on the 
expansion and further development of spaces like the Committee on World Food Security. 
However, this Committee is totally unique in its prioritization of TSMO expertise, such that given 
the urgency of the climate crisis and the slow movement of international governance, social 
movement climate work will likely continue to exist and succeed mostly outside of established 
politics.  
While I believe my research contributes to conversations about developing strategies in the 
environmental movement, there is much more research to be done in order to better inform the 
theoretical framing of a social movement led solution to the climate crisis. First, my research 
focuses on a small-time frame and is based upon incomplete data from alternating years. A longer 
time frame and a more dedicated commitment to obtaining data on all relevant TSMOs could allow 
for more robust analysis of recent developments in the behavior of TMSOs. The largest area for 
further research is a more qualitative endeavor into the stated motivations of TSMOs. By 
examining the opportunities provided by IGOs in pragmatic relationships, I worked backwards 
trying to understand how these opportunities may motivate engagement. However, it would be 
more useful and accurate to analyze the stated intention of TSMOs in these engagement through 
interviews and case studies. My research attempted to focus on a more macro analysis of these 
motivations but examining particular relationships more closely and gathering data from the 
perspective of TSMOs would make for a more robust analysis of motivations.  
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Finally, in understanding the power dynamics between TSMOs and established global 
actors it also important to consider financial ties. Financial ties were excluded from the analysis of 
this paper because the relationships were considered too different from partnerships with IGOs to 
make for a cohesive analysis. Additionally, it is very difficult to gain access to reliable data on 
funding ties. However, to fully gain an understanding of the developing power of TSMOs it is 
important to consider how they are funded and how this funding influences their operations. I 
collected the data to make this analysis possible in the future, though as suggested in Smith et al 
2018, considerable gaps in reporting would require this data is supplemented with further research 
on funding ties.  
In all, addressing the climate crisis will require radical solutions that challenge the current 
political, economic and cultural world order. Currently, the corporate influence, neoliberal logic 
and emphasis on nation states that dominates within international politics makes it so many IGOs 
are not hospitable to radical climate solutions. So, meaningful solutions to the climate crisis are 
being organized outside of these spaces, under the leadership of social movement organizations 
and the knowledge of local experiences. This work will likely continue to be propagated outside 
of established politics for years to come. However, this research demonstrates that there exists a 
number of TSMOs that are working to advance radical solutions within established politics, as to 
make these solutions better known and understandable to a diverse range of actors and that there 
is increasing signs of hope for cooperation and ways for TSMOs to carve out space within 
established politics that is hospitable to radical solutions.  
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Appendix A  
Appendix A.1 IGO Connection Data Methods 
Empirical challenges to Documenting these relationships over time: 
• Not every IGO has a formal mechanism for engaging with non-state actors 
o Only select few IGOs allow TSMOs to apply for what is called consultative status 
o TSMOs may be rejected  
• Many IGOs establish informal connections with TSMOs and other NGOs 
o often based on interpersonal connections between activists and IGO officials 
• Many groups neglect to report ties and some reported ties may no longer be active  
 
Methods to Combat Empirical Challenges:  
 
The methods used to combat these empirical challenges were developed and used by Smith et al. (2020). I followed their 
methodology. Basically, it is expected that IGO relationships may not be reported or may be underreported for two types of groups: 
those with “limited resources that rush through the survey” and those with “extensive resources that rely less on ties to IGOs for 
legitimacy”. To deal with this only TSMOs that report at least one tie to an NGO are included in the sample. Because it is expected 
that groups which report ties to NGOs are likely to report ties to IGOs if they have them. So, rejectionist TSMOs are “rejectionist” 
from IGOs only, meaning that they report at least one connection to NGOs. This also helps ensure our ideological understanding of 
rejectionism in that these TSMOs are capable of forming connections and relationships and successfully do so with actors that are not 
IGOs. Also, this ensures there is not a cofounding relationship between age and difficulty in forming relationships. Although this 
approach decreases the chance TSMO are miscategorized as rejectionist, it also likely leads to an underestimation of the share of 
TSMOs without any ties to IGOs. 
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Appendix A.2 IGO Provided Opportunities Scores 
 









Table 8 IGO Influence Opportunities part 2 
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Table 10 IGO Access Opportunities Part 2
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